I want to take you back in time to November and December of 2006 before I arrange some stories from today below them. Keep in mind too my other posts over the last four weeks concerning the ISG, Baker, Iran, Israel, and the World Bank...
~ TOSOZ
November/December 2006
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
WHAT WE ARE THINKING:
FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Edward P. Djerejian
Edward P. Djerejian is the founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. He has served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador to Syria, and Ambassador to Israel
The recent fighting in the Levant presents a fundamental challenge for U.S. policy toward the Middle East -- but also an opportunity to move from conflict management to conflict resolution. The United States should seize this moment to transform the cease-fire in the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict into a step toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Doing so would facilitate the marginalization of the forces of Islamic radicalism and enhance the prospects for regional security and political, economic, and social progress.
The Hezbollah-Israeli confrontation has further proved what should already have been painfully clear to all: there is no viable military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even with its military superiority, Israel cannot achieve security by force alone or by unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories. Nor can Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and similar groups destroy Israel. Peace can come only from negotiated agreements that bind both sides.
Hezbollah may have ignited the spark that set off this latest confrontation, but it is not the root cause. The fighting was the combined result of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle between the forces of moderation and those of extremism within the Muslim world -- two issues that are linked by the radicals' exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict for their own political ends. U.S. policy in the region should thus focus both on trying to promote a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and on helping Muslim moderates by facilitating political and economic reform across the Middle East.
THE NORTHERN FRONT
The crisis on the Israeli-Lebanese border this summer erupted in an already tense environment. On June 25, Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier, which reignited fighting on the Israeli-Palestinian front. When Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers on July 12, it precipitated a strong Israeli military reaction, which, by his own admission, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had not anticipated.
The Hezbollah-Israeli war lasted 34 days, with major Israeli incursions into Lebanon and the firing of some 4,000 Hezbollah rockets. The fighting resulted in major casualties (approximately 855 Lebanese and 159 Israelis killed), as well as large displacements of people on both sides of the border. Lebanon sustained economic and infrastructure damage estimated at $3.9 billion, and the toll on Israel has been figured as running into the hundreds of millions.
When the hostilities began, the international community called for an immediate cease-fire, but the Bush administration held off, calling for a "sustainable" cease-fire instead. The Bush administration left the strong impression that it was giving Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government time to inflict serious damage on Hezbollah's infrastructure and personnel. Meanwhile, the administration and Israel clearly identified Iran and Syria as the main state supporters of Hezbollah's actions, and the danger of a wider regional conflict was not dismissed.
Eventually, the international community stepped in to stabilize southern Lebanon and prevent the crisis from escalating further. The parameters for international action had been set by UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, which called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah. Resolution 1701, passed on August 11 of this year, refers to the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the presence of a UN force, and the commitment of the government of Lebanon to extend its authority over its territory; it also takes note of proposals regarding the Shebaa Farms area. In other words, it provides the necessary framework to support the Lebanese government's development and the implementation of Beirut's plan to regain sovereign control over the whole country.
Still, an outside stabilization program is urgently required to help this happen. Such a program would need to include an agreement on a lasting and comprehensive cease-fire, the return of both Israeli and Arab hostages and prisoners, and an international support package involving economic, humanitarian, and security assistance for Lebanon. It would also need to contain realistic plans for deploying the Lebanese army to the south of the country, disarming Hezbollah, and preventing illicit arms shipments to Lebanon. And it would need to include a solution to the disagreements over the control and sovereignty of Shebaa Farms. The successful implementation of such a stabilization program would not just help resolve current tensions; it could also provide the basis for moving forward on negotiations for an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement in the context of a comprehensive settlement.
Syria, meanwhile, poses both a danger and an opportunity. The Assad regime could undermine security arrangements in southern Lebanon, hinder progress in Iraq, and continue to support Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and radicals in Hamas. But it could also play a constructive role in the region -- a possibility that has yet to be fully explored. The Bush administration's engagement with the Syrians from 2003 to 2005 left both sides frustrated. Washington felt that Damascus offered too little too late, and Damascus felt that Washington constantly increased its demands and refused to be satisfied. Nevertheless, ever since the 1991 Madrid peace conference, Damascus has looked to Washington as the key interlocutor between itself and Israel in negotiations over the return of the Golan Heights. The extensive talks that took place during the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton may not have resulted in a final agreement, but they came very close, hashing out the major issues of land, peace, security, and water.
The main problems on Israel's northern front now are Hezbollah and the inability of the government of Lebanon to exert authority throughout the entire country. Since Syria facilitates Hezbollah's access to arms and money, any sustainable solution in southern Lebanon would require Syria to be on board. Given Syria's historically special relationship with Lebanon, Damascus would not countenance a separate deal between Beirut and Jerusalem, and so the Israeli-Lebanese and the Israeli-Syrian negotiating tracks will have to proceed in parallel.
If Syria is Hezbollah's facilitator, Iran is its key ideological, political, and financial patron. Hezbollah is a grass-roots Lebanese Shiite political party and militia. Nasrallah and the party decide and manage local political, social, and cultural issues on their own, including tactical decisions on paramilitary operations against Israel. But the group recognizes the absolute political and religious authority of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on doctrinal and strategic issues. Any sustainable agreement with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, therefore, would also have to involve Iran.
Dealing with Iran is problematic. Nevertheless, Washington and Tehran have engaged each other on Afghanistan (constructively), Iraq (less so), and the nuclear issue (as part of an international process). And although Iran sees it as being in its interest to have the United States suffer in Iraq, it does not want U.S. policy there to fail and the country to slip into full-scale civil war or territorial disintegration. Iran's population is just over half Persian, but almost a quarter of the population is Azerbaijani and a small part is Kurdish or Arab, making communal unrest a constant worry. Accordingly, the United States should consider dealing more directly with Iran on specific areas of interest, disavowing regime change as a specific goal and focusing on long-term policies to encourage and support political and economic liberalization and indigenous reform efforts there.
THE PALESTINIAN FRONT
On the Israeli-Palestinian front, finally, it is critical to support and reengage Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the focal points of negotiations and move from managing the current fighting toward true conflict resolution.
Shortly before Hezbollah kidnapped the Israeli soldiers and triggered the recent fighting on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue had reached the beginning of a way out of that crisis. An understanding was being brokered by Egypt whereby the Palestinians would commit to the safe release of the kidnapped Israeli corporal, Gilad Shalit, Qassam rocket attacks would stop, and a cease-fire would be declared and maintained. There were reliable reports that the Israelis were also prepared to release Palestinian prisoners to Abbas in return for the cease-fire.
The formation of a national unity government between Fatah and Hamas, which as of this writing seems possible, could be a step toward integrating Hamas into a more responsible government. The external wing of Hamas, led by Khaled Meshal in Damascus, has demonstrated a more militant and radical bent, while Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, who is from Hamas, and his colleagues inside the territories are struggling with the requirements of governing and have to consider difficult political compromises. U.S. policy should be sensitive to these political dynamics and encourage Hamas to move in a more moderate direction.
The Quartet -- the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations -- has laid out the requirements that Hamas recognize Israel's right to exist, give up terrorism, and respect all signed agreements. Hamas is basically being asked to do what other Arab governments have already done -- namely, accept all applicable UN resolutions and the Arab peace initiative issued at the Arab League summit in Beirut in 1992, which called for recognizing Israel in exchange for a comprehensive peace settlement. To move forward on the Palestinian track, the Quartet should now promote a clearly delineated multistaged approach toward resolving the political, security, and economic issues.
The political framework for Israeli-Palestinian peace is reiterated in the road map and its call for a two-state solution; the task now is to detail the unilateral and coordinated steps all sides must take before negotiations on a final peace settlement. Regarding security, the challenge is to help stabilize the Palestinian territories, reform and reorganize the Palestinian security services, disarm and integrate individual armed groups into the new security force structure, and establish central control by the PA over the use of force. In both the Palestinian and the Lebanese contexts, the success of disarmament and integration will ultimately be the product of political agreements.
And on the economic front, the international community must help promote reforms and avoid a humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories, particularly Gaza, by focusing on four key issues: the payment of monthly salaries to the PA's civil and police employees; the financing of health, education, and social programs for the population at large; covering the running costs of essential public institutions and municipal services; and the financing of infrastructure projects. Israel should also be encouraged, with all due consideration for its legitimate security needs, to increase the number of Palestinian workers inside its economy and facilitate the movement of goods across its borders.
ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH
The extremists in the Muslim world today define the conflict with Israel as an existential one, using terms similar to those prevalent in the region half a century ago. The moderates accept the possibility of a political settlement based on the principle of land for peace; for them, in other words, the issue is about Israel's borders, not about its existence. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (adopted in 1967 and 1973, respectively) embody this latter approach, and the United States should resume its traditional role of pressing for their implementation.
After the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led the effort to obtain the disengagement agreements between Israel, Syria, and Egypt. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter brought Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat together to sign the peace treaty between their two countries. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker led the effort to bring Israel and all of its immediate Arab neighbors together for the first time in direct negotiations in Madrid. President Clinton presided over the signing of the Oslo accords on the White House lawn in 1993, witnessed the signing of the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, and made a major effort toward the end of his term in office that, while it did not lead to a signed agreement, defined the contours of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. This track record proves that with strong presidential leadership, the United States can be an effective interlocutor between the Arabs and the Israelis.
President George W. Bush should therefore reiterate the vision of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement that he presented in June 2002, including his explicit call for a two-state solution involving a Palestinian state living in peace and security next to the state of Israel, and make it clear that he will work toward that end with the international community for the remainder of his presidency. This could give the parties in the region the political space they need to make the tough decisions and compromises for a negotiated peace. This thorough approach to peace, which would bring all the Arab and Israeli parties together to address the issues on the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian fronts in a parallel manner, could be modeled after the Madrid peace conference of 1991.
All of the key issues in the Middle East -- the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for regionwide political and economic reforms, extremism, and terrorism -- are inextricably linked. Nothing short of a comprehensive strategy can solve the problems, marginalize the radicals, and promote the values and interests of the United States and the parties in the region. Washington has waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question now is whether it can muster the political will to wage peace as well.
On December 21, 2006:
The kept creatures of the Arab world
Posted By Melanie Phillips
Various writers have been drawing attention to the Arab — and particularly, Saudi — connections to Jimmy Carter and James Baker III.
Rachel Ehrenfeld sets out Jimmy Carter’s links HERE
while on FrontPageMag.com Jacob Laskin writes:
Especially lucrative have been Carter’s ties to Saudi Arabia. Before his death in 2005, King Fahd was a longtime contributor to the Carter Center and on more than one occasion contributed million-dollar donations. In 1993 alone, the king presented Carter with a gift of $7.6 million. And the king was not the only Saudi royal to commit funds to Carter’s cause. As of 2005, the king’s high-living nephew, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, has donated at least $5 million to the Carter Center.
Meanwhile the Saudi Fund for Development, the kingdom’s leading loan organization, turns up repeatedly on the center’s list of supporters. Carter has also found moneyed allies in the Bin Laden family, and in 2000 he secured a promise from ten of Osama bin Laden’s brothers for a $1 million contribution to his center. To be sure, there is no evidence that the Bin Ladens maintain any contact with their terrorist relation. But applying Carter’s own standard, his extensive contacts with the Saudi elite must make his views on the Middle East suspect.
Meanwhile at The American Thinker, Ed Lasky reports on Baker’s Saudi contacts:
Baker became involved in the legendary Washington, D.C. based Carlyle Group: an investment group heavily-funded by Saudi Arabian investors. Not only is he the senior counselor of the Carlyle Group; he also has an estimated $180 million dollar stake in the firm. His interests are clearly aligned with those of the Saudis. He established the James Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. No information is listed on the Institute’s website about major donors, but the Institute’s impressive building bespeaks lavish funding.
The Saudis are known to favor think tanks established by former government officials with generous support, possibly because they may prove useful to them in the future, or to reward them for past service to the Kingdom, and offer an example to others still charged with serving American national interests. Baker’s Houston-based law firm, Baker and Botts, has offices in the Saudi capital of Riyadh and in the Persian Gulf nation of Dubai. Baker and Botts defended, among others, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia who was sued by the families of the World Trade Center victims for alleged complicity in the attacks. Baker has had quite a lucrative career after his government career. … Baker is a Machiavellian maneuverer, an artful street fighter and one of the foremost practitioners of stealthy power plays in Washington.
He constructed a façade of a supposedly neutral bi-partisan working group of ‘experts’ that would formulate policies. Behind the façade, the wizard worked his wonders. He seeded the key working groups with many members who had long histories of anti-Israel activism, have records of making statements that in some cases border on anti-Semitism, and are beneficiaries of Arab oil money.
With such connections making them the kept creatures of the Arab world, it is therefore no surprise that they are intent on smoothing the path to Israel’s destruction. What is startling, however, and unforgiveable, is that with few exceptions the media has not drawn attention to this information which wholly negates their claim to be taken seriously on these matters, and instead has presented them as dispassionate and well-intentioned observers. Can you imagine what the media response would have been if the ISG or a former US President who made recommendations about the Middle East had spent years trousering cash from Jewish or Israeli interests? Quite.
ON DECEMBER 6, 2006:
Baker panel's mention of Palestinian "right of return" raises eyebrows
A reference to Palestinians' "right of return" in the report issued by the high-level Iraq Study Group broke a diplomatic taboo which sparked immediate concern in Israel and surprise among Middle East policy experts.
The reference was buried deep inside a 160-page report that urged US President George W. Bush to renew efforts to revive Israel-Palestinian peace talks as part of a region-wide bid to end the chaos in Iraq. "This report is worrisome for Israel particularly because, for the first time, it mentions the question of the 'right of return' for the Palestinian refugees of 1948," said a senior Israeli official, who was reacting to the US policy report on condition he not be identified.
A Middle East analyst who was involved in the Iraq Study Group discussions but did not participate in drafting the report expressed surprise when the reference was pointed out to him by a reporter. "It's hard to know whether that language got in there because of carelessness -- I know there were many revisions up to the very last minute -- or whether it was a deliberate attempt to fuse something to the Bush rhetoric which wasn't there before," the analyst said.
The 1993 Oslo peace accords between Israel and the Palestinians calls for a resolution of the issue of Israeli and Palestinian "refugees" as part of a final status agreement that would include the creation of a Palestinian state. But they do not use the term "right of return", which is a long-standing Palestinian demand -- rejected by Israel -- that Palestinians who fled or were driven out of what was to become the Jewish state in 1948, as well as their descendants, be allowed to return home.
Bush, in a 2002 speech in the White House Rose Garden, became the first US president to formally back the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, but he also did not mention a right of Palestinian 'return'. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group's co-chairman is former secretary of state James Baker, who as the top diplomat for Bush's father in the early 1990s clashed with Israel over its handling of the Palestinian issue.
Among his group's 79 recommendations for a policy shift on Iraq, number 17 concerned five points it said should be included in a negotiated peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The final point in the list was: "Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return and the end of conflict." "'Right of return' is not in Oslo I or Oslo II, it's not in the Bush Rose Garden speech, it's not even in UN 181, the original partition resolution -- it's part of the Palestinian discourse," said the US analyst.
TODAY:
5/31/07David Frankfurter wrote:
Blood Money
Finally, a way has been found to relieve Palestinian financial isolation and suffering. New arrangements, authorized by the US, have been found to pay Palestinian Authority salaries. Money is to be deposited with the PLO and channeled via "moderate" Palestinian leaders, represented by Fatah party leader President Mahmoud Abbas and the independent Finance Minister, Salam Fayyad.
The mechanism is designed to avoid funding terrorism or dreaded "extremists" (represented by the Hamas government) who reject a two-State solution.
Reuters reports that the US initiative is already bearing fruit, with over $80 million in international aid from Arab countries and Europe starting to flow. In fact, "Fayyad was expected to receive enough money through the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) account to pay government workers, including members of the security forces, at least half of their normal monthly wages later this week."
So let's do a double check. I invite you to read the following extracts from the Palestinian National Charter – the official PLO doctrine. Decide for yourself if this seems to be a "moderate" organisation which accepts a two state solution and rejects violence and terrorism.
Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
Article 7 : … [the Palestinian] must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.
Article 9 : Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it….
Article 10 : Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution…
Article 20: …Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history…
Article 21 : The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine…
Article 22 : Zionism is…racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism…
Article 30 : Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.
And Article 3 of the General Principles (Chapter I) of the Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (which is annexed to and regulates the Charter):
"…the armed Palestinian struggle shall be supported, and every possible effort shall be made to ensure that it continues and escalates…"
Moderate? Reject violence and terror? Accept a two state solution?
But the real test is not the theory of charters and of principles. The real test is practical. Who are the salary earners who benefit? Where does the money go?
The Funding for Peace Coalition has been issuing reports for years documenting the diversion of international aid to corruption and violence by the Palestinian Authority lead by the PLO – and especially by Fatah leaders such as Abbas and his predecessor Yasser Arafat. Despite denials by European politicians and bureaucrats, Fatah's terrorist "military wing" the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade were prime beneficiaries.
Have things changed? Who are the "government workers, including members of the security forces" who will benefit from this new funding mechanism? A little snippet of news from the Israeli Ha'aretz paper lets us in on the secret. Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades founder Khaled Shwish was arrested by the IDF two days ago, for murdering 8 Israeli civilians and injuring tens of others. This terrorist murderer is one of the many "government workers" with military rank that would be getting salary payments from the international aid channeled through "moderate" Fatah and the PLO.
Once again, the international community has found a way to fund terror and murder Jews.
Quartet urges Israel to show restraint
THE JERUSALEM POST May. 31, 2007LINK TO: Britain's largest labor union threatens to boycott
Israel must exercise restraint during its military operations in order to avoid civilian casualties, the Quartet said during a meeting centered around the situation in the Middle East in Berlin on Wednesday.
In a press statement released early Thursday morning, the Quartet condemned continued Palestinian rocket fire into Israel, but warned that the country must not react in a way that would harm civilians or cause "damage to civilian infrastructure."
The Quartet raised concerns over the incarceration of Palestinian Authority (PA)government officials and called for them to be released by Israel. Several Hamas members of parliament were jailed by Israel after Kassam rocket attacks escalated last week and resulted in the death of an Israeli woman.
Furthermore, the resumption of transfers of tax funds by Israel on behalf of the PA, read the statement, would have a significant impact on the Palestinian economy. It recommended Israel transfer money via the Temporary International Mechanism, the European emergency aid which bypasses the PA government.
The Quartet expressed concern over the deterioration of a cease-fire between Hamas and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip and called for an immediate stop to factional fighting.
The Quartet also called for an immediate release of kidnapped soldier Gilad Schalit.
LINK TO: Al-Ahram Commentary: Time to cut Israel off
LINK TO: U.N.: UN's BAN VOWS TO BOOST COOPERATION WITH ISLAMIC CONFERENCE 5/16/07
LINK TO: WEASEL ZIPPERS / U.N.EXPERT WANTS US TO RECOGNIZE HAMAS
HOW TO RECOGNIZE HAMAS:
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